John
Locke was the first philosopher in English to really think about the nature of
language, its relationship to the mind, and the relationship between language
and reality. In The Essay Concerning Human
Understanding, written in 1690 at the behest of friends, Locke set out to
describe mental processes, especially to refute the Cartesian notion of innate
ideas. As he got deeper and deeper into his examination of mind, however, he
realised that an examination of the interaction between mind and language and
the world would be necessary. I must
confess then that when I first began this discourse of the understanding, and a
good while after, I had not the least thought that any consideration of words
was at all necessary to it. But when, having passed over the original and
composition of our ideas, I began to examine the extent and certainty of our
knowledge, I found it had so near a connection with words, that, unless their
force and manner of signification were first well observed, there could be very
little said clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge. 3.9.21
Locke's
thinking about language, contained in Book
Three of the Essay is still one
of the profoundest and most perspicacious analyses of the subject, and his ideas
must be of interest to anyone who works with, or is passionate about language.
His ideas anticipate the structuralism of Saussure, and the whole field of
semiotics; he anticipates the ideas on the relationship between mind, culture
and syntax posited by Sapir and Lakoff; and also the style guides of Strunk and
White, as well as the political stylistics of Orwell.
Put
simply, for Locke, words are arbitrary symbols of ideas in the mind, not of
things in the world. This is an absolutely crucial distinction that he warns
about again and again. The act of naming is tied up with the act of
categorising ideas. When we name, we are not naming objects in the world, but
first sorting our mental ideas of those objects into categories, and then
naming those categories.
In
the two most important chapters of Book 3,
Locke dwells on the imperfections of
words, and on the way words are abused.
Of the
imperfections of words
Words
are used for two purposes, to record and communicate our thoughts. For the
first, a private use of language taking place perhaps only in the theatre of
the mind, any words will do. For the second, words must have clear agreed-upon
meaning.
Words
are imperfect because when they refer to (ideas of) abstract concepts (mixed
modes is Locke's term) these abstract concepts may in themselves be ill
understood. Abstract concepts have no counterpart in nature by which we can
judge their accuracy, they exist only in the mind.
Words
are imperfect because when they refer to (ideas of) things in the world, the
real nature of things in the world cannot be known by the mind, so we are in
fact only referring to their nominal essence, not their real essence, which exists
outside the mind. The mind can only perceive its own ideas; it cannot directly
perceive the things of the world.
These
two imperfections are inherent in the nature of language and mind, and must be
borne in mind in disputes and discussions. Locke warns that many of the
controversies and misunderstandings between societies arise through a
misunderstanding of the real nature of language. People mistakenly assume that
words reflect things, rather than ideas of things.
Were the imperfections of language as the
instrument of knowledge, more thoroughly weighed, a great many of the
controversies that make such a noise in the world, would of themselves cease;
and the way to knowledge, and perhaps peace too, lie a great deal opener than
it does. 3.9.21
His warnings
have great pertinence today, when debates about the literalness of Scripture
are beginning to influence policy and to hamper scientific progress and human
rights.
Of the abuse of
words
Locke
identified seven different abuses of words, and they are as pertinent today
in
this age of instantaneous computer mediated debate as they ever were.
The
first abuse of words is using them without a clear understanding of their
meaning, either because they had no clear meaning annexed to them to begin
with, or because their clear meaning has become obscured by current false
usage.
Second,
is the unsteady application of them, by which Locke means using a word to mean
one thing in one context, and then another thing in another context.
Third,
is the affected obscurity by professional classes. Now, to anyone who has had
to wade through swathes of the academic abuse of language by post-Derridean
scribblers, this will strike a chord. Locke points his finger at academics and
lawyers in particular, as masquerading a false subtlety. In fact, at this point
in the book, Locke's human frustrations break through the coolheaded procession
of taxonomies he is laying out, and he indulges himself in a marvellous rant
against the artificial ignorance and
learned gibberish (3.10.9) of the scholars and philosophers, who hide their
own ignorance with the mist of obscurity.
The
fourth abuse of words is to insist in their literalness, to insist that they
refer to things, not to ideas of things. So, to use a current example, when a
fundamentalist insists that the Bible is the Word of God, it is an abuse of
language to think that these are words actually spoken by God, and not words
which are merely related to the idea of 'god'. Locke warns that those brought
up in the confines of one particular system are susceptible to the error of
thinking that the terms used in that system reflect reality: These words men have learned from their very
entrance upon knowledge, and have found their masters and systems lay great
stress upon them; and therefore they cannot quit the opinion that are
conformable to nature and are the representation s of something that really
exists. 3.10.14
The
fifth abuse of words is related to Locke's concepts of essence and substance,
which we shall skate over here.
The
sixth abuse of language is to use it as if it had no imperfections as outlined
in the previous sections.
The
seventh abuse of language is any kind of language use which emphasises its
figurative qualities. For Locke, like Plato's attitude to the arts, had the
notion that artistic uses of language: metaphor, symbolism, ironic double
meanings and so on, were an abuse, because they occluded knowledge. Locke is
motivated here by his certainty that knowledge - understanding- is possible;
and that based on this certainty, language is the only way to arrive at this
knowledge. Perhaps language that foregrounds itself, its own beauty, its own sense
of play, undermines this certainty. Locke's own language use is for the most
part dry, precise, transparent, at the service of explicating his ideas. Only
occasionally does John Locke the man shine through, when he makes sarcastic
remarks against the Scholiasts, or confesses to his inability to uncover
certain aspects of mind, and on these occasions, his language foregrounds
itself more.
All
these abuses of language have made people conceited and obstinate, Locke notes.
He must be spinning in his grave to observe the way people abuse language
today.
Of the remedies
of the foregoing imperfections and abuses of words
In
Chapter 11 of Book Three, Locke
outlines some preventative measures to guard against the imperfections and
abuses of words. These measures are necessary for anyone concerned with the
search for truth.
The
first remedy is to use words only when you have ideas annexed to them. Users
of, like, valley speak, like, take note, ok?
Second,
to have distinct determinate ideas
annexed to words, and to clearly define these ideas.
Third,
to use words in the way common use
has marked them.
Fourth,
words can be defined in the following three ways: by synonyms, or examples; by
definitions (technically, this means explaining the word by not using a synonym or an example); by
showing (a picture of) the thing (of the idea) to which the word refers.
The
fifth remedy is to use words consistently with the same meaning, and when one
is not doing so, to explain the variation.
This I think I may at least say, that we
should have a great many fewer disputes in the world, if words were taken for
what they are, the signs of our ideas only, and not for the things themselves.
3.10 15.
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