Showing posts with label Barthes. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Barthes. Show all posts

Monday, December 30, 2013

"Empire of Signs" Roland Barthes

Barthes's book on Japan belongs to the same genre as Swift's Gullivers’ Travels, Montesquieu’s Persian Letters, Voltaire's Candide and as Barthes himself signals, Michaux's Garabagne. In this genre, travellers to a foreign country which is largely mythical, fictional, fantastic, reflect on that country's institutions, casting light on the writers' own.

This may seems a strange assertion. Japan is a real place, and Barthes really visited it. But this book is more an examination of Western thought about Japan, especially about Zen, and about Western thought itself, about how Western thought and language is ceaselessly spinning out sign systems, is in fact, an infinite supplement of supernumerary signifiers which form the basis of Western consciousness. In Empire of Signs Barthes imagines the possibility of this ceaseless chatter ceasing, he imagines a system of emptiness, which he sees in Japanese/Zen culture.

The book is short, consisting of 26 very short chapters on different aspects of Japan: food, chopsticks, calligraphy, pachinko, the haiku, the eyelid and so on. Barthes's meditations are spot-on accurate, imaginative, fanciful, grounded in reality, and beautifully expressed.

The book is a kind of dialogue (between East and West), and this is reflected at sentence level; sentences seem to have two layers, the direct and the parenthetical:
A Frenchman (unless he is abroad) cannot classify French faces; doubtless he perceives faces in common, but the abstraction of these repeated faces (which is the class to which they belong) escapes him.

Barthes comments on his own comments. At the level of the discourse then, the book enacts that infinite supplement of supernumerary signifiers, nudging the reader into his own supernumerary signifiers.

I'm going to briefly summarize the four short chapters on haiku. Bold is chapter titles, italics are quotes from Barthes, parentheses are my comments.

It is evening, in autumn,
All I can think of
Is my parents
Buson

1. The Breach of Meaning
·      the deceptive easiness of haiku
·      it is intelligible but appears to mean nothing (nothing beyond itself)
·      it presents its meaning simply
·      in contrast with Western poetry which demands a chiselled thought, the haiku allows one to be trivial, short, ordinary
·      Western poetry has unavoidably two systems of meaning: the symbol, the metaphor; and reasoning, the syllogism
·      (for the Western reader) the haiku is attracted to one or other of these two signification systems
·      first: we assign the haiku a 'poetic' meaning - in Western lit, 'poetic' is a symbol of the ineffable, the inexpressible-
·      in this poetic meaning, everything in the haiku becomes symbolic
·      second: we see the three lines of the haiku as a syllogism: rise, suspense, conclusion
·      if we renounce both these systems, commentary becomes impossible: to comment on the haiku means simply to repeat it
·      Western methods of interpretation fail the haiku

The West moistens everything with meaning like an authoritarian religion which imposes baptism on entire peoples.

The work of reading which is attached to it is to suspend language, not to provoke it.

How admirable he is
Who does not think "Life is ephemeral"
When he sees a flash of lightning
Basho

 2. Exemption from Meaning
·      the Buddhist syllogism contains four propositions:
·      this is A
·      this is not A
·      this is both A and not-A
·      this is neither A nor not-A
·      this is the obstructed meaning, an impossible paradigm
·      in this way, Zen wages a war against meaning
·      for example, the Sixth Patriarch recommended his students to give the following answer: if questioning you, someone interrogates you about non-being, answer with being. If you are questioned about the ordinary man, answer by speaking about the master etc
·      (The Sixth Patriarch is one of the major figures of Zen/Chan Buddhism, a Chinese Scholar/monk 大鑒惠能 Dajien Huineng early 8th C BCE)
·      the patriarch's recommended response is designed to disrupt the paradigms of Q&A/language and therefore to imperil the search for meaning
·      Zen makes the mere mechanism of meaning apparent

·      the haiku is an attempt to attain a flat language, a language with no layers of meaning (Barthes calls this 'a lamination of meaning') - a first level signifier: a signifier which is matte
·      all we can do with this matte signifier is scrutinize it, not solve it
·      Zen and the haiku are a praxis designed to halt language
·      Satori (Nirbana, enlightenment) is a suspension of the constant inner language of consciousness
·      because language sums up other languages to penetrate meaning - secondary signifiers, thoughts of thoughts - Zen perceives of this a kind of jamming
·      the abolition of secondary thought is one of the aims of the haiku
·      the haiku attacks the symbol as a semantic operation (by refusing the possibility of a secondary language)

·      it does this by measuring language, a concept which is inconceivable to the Western mind
·      the Western mind always tries to make signifier and signified disproportionate (by saying a little with many words, or by saying a lot with few words)
·      the haiku, on the other hand is an adequation of signifier and signified, a suppression of margins, smudges and interstices
·      in the haiku, signified and signifier are measured ('get the measure' of something is also meant by this)

·      the practice of saying haiku twice:
·      saying it once is to give the meaning of surprise to its sudden, perfect appearance
·      saying it more than twice is to simulate profundity, to postulate that meaning can be discovered in it
·      saying it twice is an echo, neither singular, nor profound

There is a moment when language ceases and it is this echoless breach which institutes at once the truth of Zen and the form -brief and empty- of the haiku.

...perhaps what Zen calls 'satori' is no more than a panic suspension of language, the blank which erases in us the reign of the Codes, the breach of that internal recitation which constitutes our person...('Codes' is a Barthesian term, from S/Z, meaning the reference discourses which underlie Western literature. Basically, here he means any kind of secondary thoughts.)

The echo merely draws a line under the nullity of meaning.

I come by the mountain path.
Ah! this is exquisite!
A violet!
Basho

I saw the first snow
That morning I forgot
To wash my face
(unattr)


 3. The Incident
·      Western art transforms the 'impression' into a description
·      in the West description - A Western genre- is the equivalent of contemplation
·      two kinds of contemplation: forms of the divinity (Loyola), evangelical narrative episodes
·      in the haiku, there is no metaphysics centred around a subject or around a god
·      the haiku is centred around the Zen character Mu (nothing), an apprehension of the thing as an event, not as substance
·      the haiku is centred on what happens to language, rather than what happens to the subject producing/receiving the language
·      the haiku does not describe (this seems counter intuitive until one realises what Barthes means by ‘describe’, namely, the relationship between the sign and the signified. According to B this relationship doesn't exist in the haiku. In the haiku, language has no referent, is the essence of appearance, and an untenable moment. It is language degree Zero. Barthes calls this later in the essay an 'escheat of signification')
·      it presents language as a category, as a painting, a miniature picture

·      the order and dispersion of haiku, in anthologies and other texts
·      on the one hand there is plethora, on the other brevity
·      this creates a dust of fragmentary events with no direction or termination
·      the haiku and the self, the self is nothing but the site of reading, timeless
·      the haiku reflects the self
·      for example, in the Hua Yen doctrine (one of the key tenets of Mahayanna Buddhism, the Buddhism of China and East Asia, the origin, one can say, of Zen), a haiku is a jewel which reflects all the other jewels in a kind of irradiation, but one with no centre
·      in the West, the analogy of this is the dictionary, a play of reflections without origin
·      reflection: in the West, the mirror reflects the self, in the East, a mirror reflects nothingness, it is empty

·      this can be applied to everything which happens in the street in Japan
·      the streets are full of incidents, which a Westerner can only read in the way he reads a haiku
·      but the ability to create haiku is denied the Westerner (because of the way his consciousness is founded in language and his concept of language as a system generating secondary languages)
·      the incidents observed in the street do not have anything picturesque about them, nor do they have anything novelistic about them
·      novelistic: they do not contribute to the chatter which would make them descriptions or narratives
·      the incidents of the street present a rectitude of line, a stroke, a gesture
·      the graphic nature of Japanese life, writing alla prima
·      the line does not express, but causes to exist
·      there can be no hesitation, no regret, no trial and error in the stroke of the brush
·      these gestures do not refer back to the self, there is no self-sufficiency, only graphism

The haiku's time is without subject: reading has no other self than all the haikus of which this self, by infinite refraction, is never anything but the site of reading.

The haiku reminds us of what has never happened to us; in it we recognize a repetition without origin, an event without cause, a memory without person, a language without moorings.

The old pond:
A frog jumps in:
Oh! the sound of the water.
Basho

4. So
·      the purpose of haiku is to achieve exemption from meaning
·      this is impossible in Western lit, which contests meaning only by making it incomprehensible
·      the haiku resists commentary, and it's this commentary which is the most ordinary exercise of our consciousness
·      the haiku doesn't instruct, express, divert- it serves none of the purposes usually attributed to literature due to its insignificance and due to the way it resists finality
·      the haiku is written just to write

·      in Western lit there are two basic functions: description and definition (again Barthes is using ‘describe’ in a special sense here: embellish with significations, with moralities, committed as indices to the revelation of a truth or of a sentiment)
·      the haiku resists both of these
·      the haiku does not describe in the sense of giving meaning to reality
·      the haiku does not define except only in the sense of giving a gesture, but this gesture is only an efflorescence of the object
·      the haiku only designates, it has no vibration or recurrence
·      it says: 'it's that', or 'it's thus' or 'it's so', or even just 'so.'
·      it's like the flash of a photo one takes very very carefully, but with no film in the camera
·      the haiku is stripped of any mediation of knowledge, of possession, of nomination,
·      it's like a child pointing at something and saying 'That!'

The haiku's task is to achieve exemption from meaning within a perfectly readerly discourse (a contradiction denied to Western art, which can contest meaning only by rendering its discourse incomprehensible).

The haiku is a faint gash inscribed upon time.

Nothing special says the haiku, in accordance with the spirit of Zen...nothing special has been acquired, the word's stone has been cast for nothing; neither waves nor flow of meaning.

Full moon
And on the matting
The shadow of a pine tree

In the fisherman's house
The smell of dried fish
And heat

The winter wind blows
The cat's eyes
Blink
unattr.


How many people
Have crossed the Seta bridge
Through the autumn rain?
Joko

Sunday, September 29, 2013

"A Lover's Discourse" Roland Barthes


Love has been written and sung about since our species first learned to produce language, and its effects on the emotions, the heart, the personality and the body have been studied, recorded, analysed and celebrated from the dawn of history. What interests Barthes more than these however, is the effect of love on the mind, on the intellect, specifically that part of the mind which produces language.  For Barthes, love exists as an outpouring of language: “I’m so in love!” “I love you so much!”, “I love him”, “I love her” etc. Love exists, then, in its most developed form, as an ejaculation, as discourse produced by the lover, whether mental or uttered. What Barthes does is to focus on this discourse, but in such a way as to enact it rather than to analyse it.

Language is either transactional – we use it to do things - or descriptive – we use it to describe things. Either way, it is locked into one or other of these two modes. The challenge for Barthes was to liberate language from either of these two ways of being and to give language a third possibility, that of the truly declarative and expressive; a mode in which language expresses meaning not by referring to things, but by virtue of its own structure. In simple structuralist terms, ‘cat’ means cat not because of any inherent relationship between word and object, but because ‘cat’ is not ‘bat’ nor ‘car’ nor ‘cut’, and because we have agreed amongst ourselves that this pattern of sounds, this structure and no other, shall stand for this and not for something else.

In two works from 1977, Barthes attempted to apply his ideas about language to two of the most traditionally conventionalised genres: the autobiography, and the love story. In both these works he reached for a method that would empty language of its content and bring to prominence its form, its structures; to find a mode uninflected by referentiality or utility: a writing degree zero, in which writing is not about something other than itself.

A Lover’s Discourse attempts to create a discourse about love which does not merely describe love or refer to it or analyse, novelise it, but to simulate it, to dramatise it, to recreate it. As Barthes puts it: the description of the lover’s discourse has been replaced by its simulation, and to that discourse has been restored its fundamental person, the I, in order to stage an utterance, not an analysis. This is not an analysis of love, but a staged utterance. We are to read it as the unmediated thoughts – discourse – of the lover himself.

In attempting to liberate language from its two constraining modes, Barthes has created a highly original structure. Taking as its model the dictionary – another work in which language is not about anything other than itself – the book consists of 80 fragments, each consisting of four elements or layers.

The first layer is what Barthes calls the figure, a gesture, to which all the other elements in the fragment point: No Answer. The second layer is a headword: mutisme/silence, and it is under these headwords that the fragments are arranged alphabetically. The third layer is a sentence which defines the headword and the figure: the amorous subject suffers anxiety because the loved object replies scantily or not at all to his language (discourse or letters). The fourth layer then gives a series of numbered aphorisms in the style of Nietzsche, which in different ways comment on, develop, contradict or exemplify the figure. There is thus a movement within each entry of all the major elements of language: from the phrase and the word, through to the sentence and the aphorism, and ultimately to the text itself.

By organizing the entries in alphabetical order, Barthes avoids the pitfall of editorializing – the arrangement of fragments into some order determined by something outside language, something resembling a narrative arc or personal experience, or more artistic considerations such as pitch or pace. At the same time he also avoids an extra-linguistic ordering according to coincidence or chronology. The alphabet is an ordering system that belongs to language itself. An alphabetical ordering, therefore, maintains the formal purity of the language.

Because language in its purist essence is a structure that only has meaning by reference to itself, each entry includes references to other stretches of language on love, to conversations with friends and lovers, to the great works of European literature on love: The Sorrows of Young Werther, the Symposium, Stendahl’s De l’Amour, Freud, Lacan, Proust and so on. The use Barthes makes of these quotations and the way he illuminates them are one of the highlights of the work. (The only weakness, if we may permit ourselves to be critical of a work so full of wisdom and beauty, is the complete absence of any reference to Shakespeare, surely the wisest and most comprehensive teacher of love in European literature.)

Everywhere, Barthes focuses on the relationship between love and language, the discourse of love. Some examples. Here he is on I-love-you:

I-love-you is without nuance. It suppresses explanations, adjustments, degrees, scruples. In a way – exorbitant paradox of language – to say I-love-you is to proceed as if there were no theatre of speech, and this word is always true, has no other referent than its utterance: it is a performative.

On the scene, or lovers’ quarrel:

It is characteristic of the individual remarks in a scene to have no demonstrative, persuasive end, but only an origin and this origin is never anything but immediate: in the scene I cling to what has just been said.

Or on the way we cover the loved being in language in trying to pinpoint exactly what it is we love about that person:

Industrious, indefatigable, the language machine humming inside me – for it runs nicely- fabricates its chain of adjectives. I cover the other with adjectives, I string out his qualities, his qualitas.

Or the meaning of the lovers tautology: “You are adorable because you are adorable, I love you because I love you.”:

Is not tautology that preposterous state in which are to be found, all values being confounded, the glorious end of the logical operation, the obscenity of stupidity, and the explosion of the Nietzschean yes?

In passing, Barthes occasionally drops these shattering epigrams, as if they have no meaning, no significance, no importance:

Orgasm is not spoken, but it speaks, and it says I-love-you.
Cannot friendship be defined as a space with total sonority?
The third person pronoun is a wicked pronoun: it is the pronoun of the non-person, it absents, it annuls.
Since man has existed he has not stopped talking.

Now, in case this sounds like the laying of the dead hand of structuralism on the living pulse of a poetic emotion; if it sounds dry and intellectual, let me assure you that it is anything but. The book is beautiful, playful, full of arresting insights, new ideas, lyrical and tender, witty, sympathetic, moving,  sensual, joyous.  In short, it is everything you would expect a book about love to be. And if one reads it when one is in love, truthful and accurate to a powerful degree.

The word is not the thing, but a flash in whose light we perceive the thing.
Diderot